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INTRODUCTION
HEDGE FUNDS HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY in recent time, especially
in the wake of the failure of Amaranth Advisors, L.P. in September 2006.1 Though
the exact definition of a hedge fund still is unclear to many observers, a Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff report defined a hedge fund as "an entity
that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose interests are not sold
in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an investment com-
pany ...."2 As this definition suggests, hedge funds are, for all practical purposes,
unregulated and exempt from SEC disclosure and registration. This exemption per-
mits funds to engage in risky trading activities, while potentially earning signifi-
cantly higher returns than other investment entities like mutual funds.' Moreover,
hedge funds are not required to disclose their trading strategies or the positions
they take in the market.4 In short, hedge funds are highly secretive investment
vehicles.
Although hedge funds are risky investments, they provide an excellent risk/re-
ward opportunity for many qualified, wealthy investors.' These funds have the po-
tential to earn stellar returns for investors because of the lack of regulation. Thus,
hedge funds should continue to be unregulated.6
While hedge funds should remain unregulated, and the SEC should not impose a
blanket requirement for registration of them, something needs to be done to re-
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, 2008; B.A., Vanderbilt University, 2002.
I. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004); see also Ann Davis, Gregory Zuckerman & Henny
Sender, Hedge-Fund Hardball: Amid Amaranth's Crisis, Other Players, WALL ST. J., )an. 30, 2007, at Al.
2. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
3. Id. at 875-76. Mutual funds are prohibited, under the Investment Company Act of 1940, from engag-
ing in volatile and risky trades, like derivatives. Id. Moreover, mutual funds are required to disclose to investors
their investment strategies and the positions they take in the market. Id.
4. Id.
5. Chuck Jaffe, New Hedge Fund Regulations Not Good Investment, CHi. TRIB., Oct. 3, 2006, at B5; see also
Editorial, Targeting Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2006, at A18.
6. Jaffe, supra note 5; see also Targeting Hedge Funds, supra note 5.
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strict hedge funds from welcoming investment money from pension funds. Pension
funds, which manage the retirement benefits for municipal employees, teachers,
and the like, have found unregulated hedge funds as enticing vehicles for outstand-
ing returns.7 Yet, it is just the kind of people who rely on pension funds for retire-
ment income that the securities laws were designed to protect through disclosure
and regulation
Under the current structure, pension funds are permitted to invest in hedge
funds without triggering registration requirements of securities laws because the
alleged investment sophistication of the pension fund manager is imputed on all
the pensioners.' Moreover, the pooled nature of its assets permits the pension fund
to invest in vehicles for which the pensioners themselves would not have sufficient
net worth.' But for the imputed sophistication, and pooled nature of the pension,
these teachers and municipal employees would frustrate the exempt nature of the
offering." It is this fact that makes pension fund investment in hedge funds
troubling.
As a group, teachers and municipal employees generally are not sophisticated
investors. More importantly, they cannot afford to lose their retirement benefits. By
investing in hedge funds, pension funds expose these peoples' retirement benefits to
tremendous amounts of risk. Even more troubling is the fact that hedge funds have
no disclosure requirements. 2 With no disclosure on a fund's positions and strate-
gies, a pension fund is unable to assess the hedge funds' risk. The failure of Ama-
ranth Advisors, L.P. serves as proof of this because the San Diego County
Employees Retirement Association lost an estimated $87 million" as a result of an
Amaranth trader who lost $6 billion dollars by taking the wrong position on natu-
ral gas prices.'4
In the wake of Amaranth's implosion, this Comment discusses how regulators
should limit pension funds (and the affiliated school teachers and municipal work-
ers who rely on them) from being exposed to such risk without forcing general
regulation on all hedge funds. One potential approach, which this Comment
adopts, would require hedge funds to review the risk bearing ability of the investor
when determining if the offering of limited partnership interests would frustrate
the hedge fund's exemption from registering the fund and its securities (the Lim-
7. Greg Burns, Pensions Betting on Hedge Funds, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26, 2007, at 1; Allan Sloan, Amaranth's
Wilting is a Lesson on Hedges, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2006, at D2.
8. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-26 (1953).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 684 n.15 (2000)
(discussing how funds usually require each investor to have a minimum net worth minimum of $1 million).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part 11.
13. Leslie Wolf Branscomb, Treasurer Demands Accounting of County Pension System Losses, SAN DIEGO
UNIoN-TRIB., Oct. 4, 2006, at B2.
14. Comment, Recipe for Sleepless Nights: Invest Blindly in a Hedge Fund, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 23,
2006, at 11.
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ited Partnership Interests) with the SEC."5 Such an analysis could be applied to
pension funds, the beneficiaries of which are not in a position to afford the loss of
their investments, and either force hedge funds to reject such investors, or register
the securities if they decide the investment is sufficiently worthwhile. This action is
important given the growing allure of hedge fund returns enticing pension fund
managers, especially where state and local governments refuse to inject money into
under-funded pensions.
I. HEDGE FUNDS AND THEIR RISK
A. The Failure of Amaranth Advisors, L.P. and the Loss to Pension Funds
Prior to September 2006, Amaranth Advisors, L.P. was considered a top hedge
fund. 7 The fund originally was founded to follow a strategy of convertible bond
arbitrage.'8 In the early 2000's, the fund decided to diversify into the energy market,
a move considered "prescient" within the industry.9 This exposure to energy mar-
kets benefited Amaranth with $1.26 billion in profits in 2005, and before the col-
lapse in September, $2 billion in profits for 2006.20
In 2005, lured by this phenomenal growth, San Diego County Employees Retire-
ment Association invested $175 million of the pension's money with Amaranth.'
The pension's quest for such great profit, despite the substantial risk, resulted
largely from the fund's need to alleviate a roughly $1 billion deficit from years of
under-funding. 2
Although Amaranth had a stellar year in 2005, much of its profit was due to
energy trading. Following this trend, the fund continued to place more of its
assets into energy trading in 2006.24 By July 2006, Amaranth had 56% of the fund's
assets in the energy market. 5
Brian Hunter, who specialized in natural gas futures, directed much of Ama-
ranth's energy trading.2 6 In August and September, however, Hunter's actions re-
sulted in the fund losing $6 billion. 7 Hunter had bet big that the hurricane season
15. See Position Papers Private Exemption Under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 31 Bus. LAw. 483,
491-92 (1975).
16. Burns, supra note 7; Andrew Ross Sorkin, A New Pension Game, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 2006, § 3, at 4.
17. Susanne Craig, Randall Smith & Ann Davis, Amaranth CEO Issues His Regrets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,
2006, at B5.
18. Recipe for Sleepless Nights, supra note 14.
19. Craig, Smith & Davis, supra note 17.
20. id.
21. Branscomb, supra note 13.
22, Opinion, Extreme Caution; County Assuming Too High Hedge-Fund Risk, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Nov. 13, 2006, at B6.
23. Recipe for Sleepless Nights, supra note 14.
24. See Davis, Zuckerman & Sender, supra note 1.
25. Id.
26. id.
27. Id.
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would result in a natural gas shortage, and thus a price spike. 8 This bet, however,
proved wrong and fatal to the fund when prices did not spike. 9 Banks immediately
issued margin demands, and Amaranth quickly found itself unable to meet these
calls because the fund was so highly exposed to the energy sector.30 The fund de-
cided to wind down its affairs and, as of early 2007, was liquidating its assets."
Initial estimates indicated that the San Diego County Employees Retirement As-
sociation would lose $105 million of its $175 million investment. 2 In January 2007,
the pension fund recouped $48.2 million from Amaranth.3 On March 29, 2007 the
San Diego County Employees Retirement Association filed a civil suit against Ama-
ranth in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking
damages for fraud, negligence, and breach of contract.3 4
B. Amaranth Is Not Alone: The Volatility of Hedge Funds
In the first half of 2006 alone, there were 326 hedge funds that went out of busi-
ness." Although these fund failures did not create front-page headlines, they serve
to remind investors that hedge funds are risky investments. More recently, some
hedge funds have suffered from overexposure to bad mortgages and other mort-
gage-related investments.36 In May 2007, two Bear Stearns hedge funds lost approx-
imately $1.6 billion of capital due to overexposure to bad mortgages. 7 Likewise, the
Swiss banking firm UBS AG shut down a hedge fund in May 2007 that lost more
than $124 million from similar bad investments."
Furthermore, the risks associated with hedge funds seem to be increasing re-
cently, as the market has become saturated with new funds.3 Funds are unable to
capitalize on cutting-edge and proprietary investment ideas with so many players in
the field taking similar positions."' This competition forces funds to take much
riskier positions than before in search of stellar returns.4'
Perhaps the most notorious hedge fund failure was that of Long Term Capital
Management ("Long Term") in 1998. In August of that year, following four years of
28. id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Branscomb, supra note 13.
33. Id.; see also Retirement Group Sues Hedge Fund, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Mar. 30, 2007, at B2.
34. See Complaint, San Diego Employees Ret. Ass'n v. Maounis et al., 1:07-CV-02618 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2007).
35. Sloan, supra note 7.
36. Greg Ip & Jon E. Hilsenrath, Debt Bomb: Inside the 'Subprime' Mortgage Debacle, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
2007, at Al.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Anita Raghavan, lanthe Jeanne Dugan & Gregory Zuckerman, Despite Blue-Chip Gains, Hedge Funds
Increasingly Are Faltering and Closing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2006 at C1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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staggering returns that quadrupled the value of the fund, Long Term lost $553
million, or 15% of the fund's capital, in one day.42 That one day loss came in the
wake of having lost one-third of the fund's equity over the previous three months.43
The root of this loss lay in Russia's default on its debt on August 17, 1998, which
caused the price of public bonds to increase significantly and the price of corporate
bonds to decrease substantially, as investors rushed to the safety of the United
States Treasury instruments." Long Term had taken a position on millions of bond
contracts, believing that the difference between corporate and public bonds was
never more than a certain percentage.45 This assumption proved fatal to the fund,
as the difference spiked following Russia's default.46
C. The Risks Manifested by These Past Incidents Serve as Warnings to Pension
Funds
Despite the woes of Amaranth and the implosion at Long Term, pension funds
recently have been migrating towards these risky investments in greater numbers.
Like the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association, many pensions have
invested in these vehicles due to pressures to increase returns in order to make up
for under-funding.47 In Illinois, the Teachers' Retirement System plans to invest $1
billion in hedge funds, despite the risk and lack of regulatory oversight.48 The story
in Illinois, as with so many other pension plans, revolves around the need to in-
crease funding because the state government refuses to step in with financial
assistance.49
As pensions continue to remain under-funded, their managers will continue to
flock to hedge funds in hopes of stellar returns. Unlike wealthy investors, however,
people relying on these pension funds for retirement cannot afford to lose money.
Given the volatility and risk associated with hedge funds, it seems probable that
another pension fund will suffer substantial losses just like San Diego County Em-
ployees Retirement Association.
42. How LTCM Came to the Edge of the Abyss, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2000, at C1.
43. id.
44. Id.; Diana B. Henriques, Billions upon Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998, § 1, at 1.
45. Henriques, supra note 44.
46. Id. Out of fears that Long Term's failure would ruin the world's markets, as much of the fund's trading
was done with money borrowed from various banks, the New York Federal Reserve engineered a buyout of
Long Term by a consortium of the largest Investment Banks in September 1998. Id.; see also How LTCM Came
to the Edge of the Abyss, supra note 42.
47. Sloan, supra note 7; Sorkin, supra note 16.
48. Burns, supra note 7.
49. Id.
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II. THE SECURITIES LAWS AND HOW HEDGE FUNDS HAVE
AVOIDED REGULATION
Federal securities laws were enacted in order "to protect investors by promoting full
disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions. '
Hedge funds, however, are able to avoid the regulation of securities laws because
they issue securities (interests in the fund) only "to those who are shown to be able
to fend for themselves ...."" This lack of regulation is based upon the assumption
that only sophisticated and well-heeled investors put money in these vehicles. 2 By
only permitting wealthy, sophisticated investors to invest in the funds, hedge funds
take advantage of several exemptions from registering set forth in the Securities Act
of 1933, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of
1940. As such, hedge funds can take volatile investment positions and use risky
investment strategies that regulated investment entities like mutual funds are pro-
hibited from taking.
A. Exemptions for Hedge Funds
1. The Non-Public Offering Exemption under the '33 Act and Reg. D
The interests acquired when one invests in a hedge fund (limited partnership inter-
ests, and the like) are considered securities and must be registered with the SEC if
they are offered or sold to the public."3 Section 5 of the '33 Act states that the offer
or sale of a security is unlawful unless that security has been registered. 4 However,
hedge funds avoid registering the interests they sell to investors, and thus remain
secretive and free from regulatory disclosure, through an exemption provided in
section 4(2) of the '33 Act for non-public offerings.55
Regulation D of the '33 Act (Reg. D) and the rules provided for in that regula-
tion, provide safe harbors for what may be considered a private offering for the
purpose of section 4(2).56 Specifically, Rule 506 under Reg. D exempts an issuer
from registering securities so long as all purchasers are "accredited investors" or can
prove they are "capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective invest-
ments."5 " The issuer also must ensure that there are no more than thirty-five pur-
chasers in an offering. 8 So long as a hedge fund sells the interests to accredited
50. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
51. Id. at 126.
52. See Targeting Hedge Funds, supra note 5.
53. Applying the Howey test for determining if an instrument is a security to the interests acquired in a
hedge fund, it is clear that there is an investment of money, in a common enterprise, with the expectation of
profit, from the efforts of another. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2000).
55. Id. § 77d(2); Gibson, supra note 10, at 690-91.
56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007). See generally Gibson, supra note 10.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
58. Id.
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investors, or those who can prove they have sufficient sophistication, the fund is
exempt from the '33 Act's registration requirements.
Hedge funds are permitted to sell interests to pension funds under Rule 501,
which provides a definition for "accredited investor." 9 Any plan established by state
governments for the benefit of state employees is considered an accredited investor,
so long as it has at least $5 million in total assets.6 In effect, the purported invest-
ment knowledge and experience of the pension fund manager is imputed on the
pension beneficiaries, who otherwise would not be considered accredited investors.
2. Exemptions under the Investment Company Act of 1940
In general terms, hedge funds are considered investment companies for the pur-
poses of the Investment Company Act.61 Hedge funds meet this definition because
they are issuers whose primary business is the investing or trading in securities.62
Investment companies are required to register with the SEC and are subject to
many rules and regulations.63 Most hedge funds, however, avoid registering under
the Investment Company Act through an exemption for funds with fewer than 100
investors.64
3. Exemptions under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
The Investment Advisers Act requires "any person who, for compensation, engages
in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writ-
ings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing, purchasing or
selling securities . . . ." to register with the SEC.65 Generally, hedge fund managers
act as the general partner of a limited partnership, and each investor invests as a
limited partner.66 The fund manager, which provides investment advice to the
hedge fund, satisfies the requirements of an investment adviser for the purposes of
the Investment Advisers Act.67 Like the other securities acts, the Investment Advis-
ers Act provides an exemption from registering for certain investment advisers.6"
Specifically, advisers with less than fifteen clients are exempt from registering with
the SEC.69
59. Id. § 230.501(a).
60. id.
61. Gibson, supra note 10, at 693-94.
62. id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (2000).
66. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
69. Id.
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B. The Effects of these Exemptions: Hedge Funds vs. Mutual Funds
Mutual funds, unlike hedge funds, are heavily regulated by the SEC. Because mu-
tual funds sell their interest to any and all investors, regardless of their sophistica-
tion, mutual funds are not able to take advantage of '33 Act exemptions, and must
register their offerings.7" Additionally, mutual funds must register under the Invest-
ment Company Act, since these funds, unlike hedge funds, generally have more
than 100 investors.7' Without the restrictions imposed upon registered investment
entities, hedge funds are free to take much riskier investment positions than mutual
funds, with the potential to earn substantially higher returns.
One major restriction placed upon mutual funds is the "undue use of leverage," 2
or borrowing money "to improve one's speculative ability and to increase an invest-
ment's rate of return."73 Mutual funds are required to maintain specified debt to
asset ratios.74 Perhaps the biggest implication of this restriction on the use of lever-
age is that mutual funds are prohibited from trading on margin and selling securi-
ties short.7 Although not expressly prohibited, there is debate over whether mutual
funds can invest in derivative instruments, given the leverage restrictions imposed
by the Investment Company Act.76
In stark contrast, hedge funds make substantial profits by regularly using lever-
age.7 7 Free from the restrictions from the Investment Company Act, hedge funds
frequently purchase stock on margin. 7' Furthermore, hedge funds use leverage to
their advantage by taking short positions on stock.79 This freedom gives hedge
funds the ability to earn substantial returns.8 0 On the flip side, however, the ability
to use leverage exposes hedge funds to tremendous amounts of risk because the
fund must provide additional capital (a margin call) in the event the stock price
goes down."' The more leveraged a fund is, the greater the chance that a fund is
unable to meet margin calls.8 2 If unable to make a margin call, the fund's position
will be liquidated or the fund will be forced to liquidate other assets, resulting in
loss to the fund much greater than the initial investment.8 3
70. Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market Volatility--What
Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 915 (2005).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 917.
73. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 415 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
74. Karmel, supra note 70, at 918.
75. id.
76. Id.
77. Gibson, supra note 10, at 686.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. By using leverage, a hedge fund can purchase securities with much less money than the face value
of the securities. Thus, if the stock price goes up, the fund can make a lot of profit with much less capital than
otherwise would be required.
81. Id. at 688.
82. Id.; see also Davis, Zuckerman & Sender, supra note 1.
83. Gibson, supra note 10, at 688.
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Additionally, the Investment Company Act imposes disclosure requirements on
mutual funds. A mutual fund must disclose the fund's investment objectives 4 and
the fund's "portfolio turnover" during the previous three years.8" In short, mutual
funds are prohibited from making dramatic and immediate changes in investment
philosophy and allocation because investors have chosen a particular fund based
upon a desire for certain kinds of exposure. Hedge funds, however, are not required
to disclose investment philosophies or portfolio turnover as they are not governed
by the Investment Company Act. Furthermore, hedge funds can change their in-
vestment positions very quickly to respond to changes in the markets, as Amaranth
Advisors did when the convertible bond market went flat and the energy markets
were booming.8 6 In short, hedge funds are limited in their investment strategies
only to the extent provided for in the partnership agreement signed by investors. 7
III. EFFORTS TO REGULATE HEDGE FUNDS
The SEC became concerned with, among other things, the growth of pension fund
investments in hedge funds and launched an investigation into hedge fund prac-
tices in 2002.8 Following the investigation, and subsequent reports on the matter,
the SEC proposed in July 2004 that the term "client" be defined to mean each
limited partner in the hedge fund, for the purposes of the Investment Advisers
Act. 9 Prior to this proposal, all hedge fund managers, acting as the General Partner
of each fund, considered each hedge fund they managed as a single client, and were
thus exempt from registering with the SEC because they each had less than fifteen
hedge funds.90 Following this proposal, however, the general partner of each fund
would have to count each limited partner (investor) in the fund as a client.9 The
majority of hedge funds had more than fifteen limited partners, thus ensuring re-
gistration with the SEC of most funds.
The SEC adopted this proposed rule, following substantial commentary from
lawyers and other industry participants, and it became effective in early 2005.92 The
rule was met with substantial controversy, as debates flared over whether the SEC
should regulate hedge funds.9" Soon after adoption, money manager Phillip Gold-
stein filed suit challenging this new rule.94
84. Karmel, supra note 70, at 918-19.
85. Id. at 919.
86. See Recipe for Sleepless Nights, supra note 14.
87. Karmel, supra note 70, at 924.
88. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,057 (Dec. 10, 2004).
89. Id. at 72,058.
90. Id.
91. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
92. Registration Under the Advisers Act, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054, 72,058.
93. Kara Scannell, Deborah Solomon & Gregory Zuckerman, Stop Order: SEC Dealt Setback as Court
Rejects Hedge-Fund Rule, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2006, at Al.
94. Id.
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In June 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit vacated the Hedge Fund Rule, finding that the rule was "arbitrary."" In the
wake of this ruling, the SEC implemented a new rule prohibiting advisers to pooled
investment vehicles from defrauding investors or prospective investors in pooled
investment vehicles they advise.96 Although this new rule grants the SEC power to
go after hedge funds for fraud, without any disclosure requirements the regulators
have no way of knowing if funds are acting fraudulently. As such, hedge funds
remain unregulated, and the SEC still cannot protect pension fund investors unable
to bear the risk of these investments vehicles.97
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO PROTECTING PENSION
FUND INVESTORS
Given the ever increasing investment by pension funds into hedge funds, coupled
with the increasing volatility of hedge funds, reasonable safeguards are necessary to
protect pensioners from the risk associated with these investment vehicles. Pension-
ers, who are typically state employees, are exactly those investors who securities
laws were designed to protect. They generally lack the investment sophistication
needed to gauge the risks involved with leverage, derivatives, and other practices of
hedge funds. Most importantly, pensioners are not investors who can afford to lose
money when hedge funds take high-risk positions or become too leveraged. The
pensioners themselves rely heavily on the draws from the fund for retirement.
Moreover, as local and state governments refuse to bail out these funds and as the
funds remain severely under-funded, any further loss could be detrimental to the
pensioners' ability to rely on the fund for retirement. This point, the general inabil-
ity for pensions to bear the loss of the investment, likewise provides a viable alter-
native for protecting pension fund investors from the risky investments through the
use of the '33 Act and Reg. D.
In the wake of Goldstein, the SEC has run into a potential roadblock in using the
Investment Advisers Act to regulate hedge funds. The approach of the Hedge Fund
Rule, which was rejected by the Court of Appeals, focused on regulating all hedge
funds.98 This approach, however, is unnecessary if the goal of the SEC is to protect
unsophisticated or unknowing investors from the perils and risks associated with
hedge funds. An alternative approach to regulating hedge funds, and one which
would focus specifically on those investors the securities laws were designed to pro-
tect, flows from the private offering exemption under section 4(2) of the 33 Act and
Rule 506 of Reg. D, which hedge funds have relied upon to exempt from registra-
tion the offering to investors of interests in the funds.
95. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883.
96. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,756 (Aug. 9,
2007).
97. Scannell, Solomon & Zuckerman, supra note 93.
98. See supra Part II.
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To protect pensioners from undue risk, the SEC could require hedge funds to
apply a risk-bearing ability analysis of investors when determining whether an of-
fering of securities is exempt from registration under section 4(2) of the '33 Act
and Rule 506 of Reg. D. This approach to determining exemption was first set-forth
in a Position Paper published by the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee,
Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1975."9 In this Position Paper, the committee suggested that an investor's
ability to bear a loss could be an appropriate element in determining whether an
offering of securities would be considered "public,"' 0 and thus not exempt from
registration under section 4(2)."1 The Committee found two important elements
in analyzing an investor's risk bearing ability: (1) the amount of money invested,
and (2) the level of risk associated with the investment. 2 Where a particular inves-
tor fails the risk bearing ability analysis, the issuer must either not offer the securi-
ties to this investor, or register the offering, as the offering would be public.
Applying this approach to hedge funds, in the initial offering of interests in the
fund to investors, hedge fund managers would be required to analyze the investor's
ability to bear the risk associated with the hedge fund. Funds could either refuse to
offer the interests to the investors unable to bear the risk, since the offering would
frustrate the private placement exemption, or could decide to register the interests
to retain those investors. Most funds would probably prefer not to register, and
thus would simply refuse to offer the interests to the investor.
In order to use this approach to protect pension funds beneficiaries, a hedge
fund manager must determine whether the pension, which would otherwise be an
accredited investor under Rule 501 of Reg. D, is unable to bear the risk associated
with the investment. Given the under-funded status of many pensions and the in-
creasing risk associated with hedge funds, it is reasonable to conclude that pension
funds lack sufficient risk bearing ability to acquire interests in a hedge fund
through a private placement without frustrating the issuer's exemption from regis-
tering. Indeed, hedge funds take extremely risky investment positions.' ° As evinced
by Amaranth's failure and Long Term's demise, hedge funds that have historically
strong returns can fail with any turn in the market.' 4 Furthermore, the fact that so
many of these funds fail establishes that hedge funds are very risky investments.' 5
99. See generally Position Papers, supra note 15.
100. In Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court determined that an offering is public if made to investors who
are in need of the protection of the Securities Laws. 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953).
101. Position Papers, supra note 15, at 491.
102. Id.
103. See supra Part lI.B.
104. See supra Part II.
105. See supra Part 11.
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As such, an investment of interests in a hedge fund carries "a significant probability
of total lOss. '1 °1 6
Pension funds are in no position to risk the loss of large segments of their invest-
ments even in the face of potentially stellar returns. First, money in pension funds
represent retirement earnings to real people. These people rely on this money to
live during retirement. Any loss to a pension's assets could negatively impact pen-
sioners who rely on this money, be it present drawers or employees who plan to
retire in the future. That so many pensions are under-funded at the moment sim-
ply increases the risk that any loss of assets of the fund could adversely affect pen-
sioners' ability to rely on the fund for retirement. Ironically, the strong earning
potentials that lure so many pensions to hedge funds, sought to make up for severe
deficits, could simply compound the funding problems of the pensions. Second, in
light of the fact that state governments are refusing to provide additional funding
for pensions, there exists no safety net for the funds. If a pension loses 10% of its
assets through a hedge fund investment, that money probably is lost for good be-
cause the government may not assist the pension with shortfalls. As such, a pension
fund would probably fail the risk bearing ability test, given the risk involved with
hedge funds and the reliance by retirees on the pension, and would not qualify for
a private offering of hedge fund interests.
One potential drawback of this approach arises for investments outside of the
pension fund/hedge fund realm because it is unclear who must determine the risk-
level of an investment. Should the onus be on issuers to pre-determine the level of
risk associated with the securities being offered? One solution would be to rely on
existing rating agencies like Moody's to make this determination." 7 Another solu-
tion to this issue, one that limits the application of the risk bearing analysis, would
be to adopt the bright-line rule that this analysis is intended to apply only to invest-
ments by pension funds in hedge funds. Such a rule would eliminate the need for
parties to make judgment calls as to the suitability of other investments.
CONCLUSION
Applying the risk bearing ability analysis to determine if a hedge fund's offering of
interests frustrates the private placement exemption under section 4(2) of the '33
Act would provide an effective solution to the problem of pension funds investing
106. Position Papers, supra note 15, at 492. In its discussion of this analysis, the Committee suggested that
an investor may be qualified for a private placement of high-mortgage bonds, but not qualified to invest in a
private offering of "highly speculative common stock... [with) a significant probability of total loss." Id.
107. Given that the SEC already looks to ratings agencies, which are also called Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, to determine the risk of default associated with debt securities, NRSROs would
be the natural choice to quantify the risk associated with an investment in a hedge fund. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c3-1 (2007); see also The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market, Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong.
133-35 (2007) (prepared statement of Julia M. Whitehead & H. Sean Mathis, Managing Director, Miller Mathis
& Co., LLC).
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in hedge funds. Because hedge funds are inherently risky investments, and pension
funds are not in a position to suffer a total loss of an investment, hedge funds
would not be permitted to offer interests to pension funds without frustrating the
private nature of the offerings. At the same time, other wealthy and qualified inves-
tors, who are in a position to bear the risk of loss, could continue to invest in these
funds without any oversight by the SEC. Furthermore, such an approach would not
preclude pension funds from investing in hedge funds because the hedge fund
could elect to register the interests under the '33 Act and sell them to pension
funds. Electing to register the interests would subject the hedge funds to SEC over-
sight and disclosure rules. Such disclosure potentially could protect pension funds
from substantial loss because hedge funds would be required to disclose their in-
vestment positions. If the hedge fund takes a position that is too risky, which is less
likely if the fund must disclose its positions, the pension fund could withdraw its
interests. As a result, this risk bearing ability analysis could protect pension funds
from the risk of hedge funds without imposing unnecessary regulation and restric-
tions on other sophisticated market participants. Although not perfect, this ap-
proach at the very least provides a reasonable solution to a growing problem and is
consistent with the original purpose of the securities laws-to protect unsophisti-
cated investors through greater disclosure.
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